“The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with firmly before it endangers the general public peace.” –Justice Malcolm
Like any other rights, the freedom of speech must be preserved and protected in order to guarantee the free flow of ideas, no matter how frivolous, illogical or unreasonable it may be. Thus, a democratic state, like ours, must not shutdown the right to free speech for it is through unfettered exchange of thoughts that moves the civilization of a society.
The Philippines being a democratic state[1] has embodied and enlarged the scope of the people’s inalienable rights. Hence, the Philippine Constitution declares that “no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances”.[2] The safeguarding of free speech, of expression and of the press to the end that men may speak and express as they think on matters vital to them and that falsehood may be exposed through the process of education and discussion is essential in a free government.[3]
It is only through debate and free exchange of ideas that government remain responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected.[4] The right to speak and to promote diversity of ideas and program is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regime. The vitality of civil and political society depends on free discussion.[5]
The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are fundamental rights of the people.[6] As a consequence of such rights, men are given at liberty to speak, to assemble, or to express, but it is not without limitation. The right to freedom of speech, though guaranteed by the constitution, is not absolute, for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the rights of the community or society and this power may be exercised by the police power of the state.[7]
Under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, it describes the crime of inciting to sedition. Inciting to sedition may be done 1) by inciting others to the accomplishment of any acts which constitute sedition by means of speeches, proclamations, writings, or emblems, or 2) by uttering words or speeches which tend to disturb public peace, or 3) by writing, publishing, or circulating scurrilous libels against the Government or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof, which tend to disturb peace.[8]
It can be observed, however, that the means of committing inciting to sedition is through expressions by means of speeches, writings, publications or use of emblems. According to Justice Cruz[9], freedom of expression is usually exercised through language, verbal and written. Symbolisms may also be used like the clenched fist, the bended knee, the salute of the flag and the like.
Nevertheless, how can the State justify its suppression of the right to speech by penalizing a person guilty of inciting to sedition, considering that the manner it is committed can well be placed in the sanctuary of the freedom of expression? It is then imperative to examine the jurisprudence under this matter.
The crime sedition, in its general sense, is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the state.[10] It is a revolt against legitimate authority.[11] Thus, in inciting to sedition it tends, among other things, to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of community, the safety and order of the Government.[12] The law is not aimed merely at disturbance, as its purpose is also to punish utterances which may endanger public order.[13] Thus, there is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the government and obedient to the laws.[14]
It is a settled principle growing out of the nature of civil societies that the exercise of those rights may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, and not injurious to the rights of the community or society.[15]It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.[16]
That utterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means, present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment within the range of legislative discretion, is clear. Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of the State. They threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial, because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen.[17]
It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has kindled the flame or blazed into conflagration.[18] It cannot reasonably require to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency.[19]
In fine a constitutional right, like the right to freedom of speech, is zealously protected by the state, but once the exercise of such right transgresses the bounds imposed by the law, the court is with authority to tilt the scales of justice for the suppression of such right, in order to preserve public peace and order.
[1] Section 1 Article II, 1987 Philippine Constitution
[2] Section 4 Article III, supra
[3] Thornbill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
[4] De Jonge vs. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
[5] Terminiello vs Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
[6]Primicias vs. Fugoso, January 27, 1948
[7] Ignacio vs. Ela, May 31, 1956
[8] Art. 142, Revised Penal Code p. 102 16th Ed. 2007 by Justice Luis B. Reyes
[9] Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 192
[10] People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64
[11] People vs. Perez, December 22, 1923
[12] Art. 142, Revised Penal Code p. 104 supra
[13] People vs. Nabong, 57 Phil. 455
[14] People vs. Perez, supra
[15] Primicias vs. Fugoso, supra
[16] Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U.S. 652
[17] supra
[18] Evangelista vs. Earshaw, September 28, 1932
[19]supra
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